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FCC LICENSE RENEWAL POLICY:
THE BROADCASTING LOBBY VERSUS THE PUBLIC INTEREST
by Mildred Louise Everett
The federal government has the power to regulate radio and television under
its power to regulate interstate commerce. Radio was first regulated by the
Federal Radio Commission, established by the Radio Act of 1927.1 This Act
was intended to insure that "the broadcasting privilege will not be a right of
selfishness" but would rather "rest upon an assurance of public interest to be
served."' The Federal Radio Commission was reorganized into the Federal
Communications Commission by the Communications Act of 1934.' The 1934
Act, with amendments, is still the controlling law in broadcasting. The FCC
is given broad power over the broadcasting industry, the most important aspect
of which is licensing.4
The FCC assigns specific channels to licensees.! The electronic spectrum in
which broadcasting is possible is limited, and thus the number of available
licenses is finite. With unregulated competition, large cities would be saturated
with stations and smaller communities might have no stations. This situation
is prevented by the FCC's distribution of channels based on population
distribution!
By statute, the only criteria for assignment of broadcasting licenses are that
they be granted in the "public interest, convenience and necessity. 7 These
criteria have never been adequately defined.! The Communications Act also
requires that licensees meet prescribed standards? of citizenship," character,1
financial resources,' and technical ability."2 Additional criteria are examined
'Act of Feb. 23, 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162.
'67 CONG. REC. 5479 (1926) (remarks of Representative White, House floor manager).
347 U.S.C. § 301 (1970).
4 W. EMERY, BROADCASTING AND GOVERNMENT: RESPONSIBILITIES AND REGULATIONS
45 (rev. ed. 1971).
547 U.S.C. § 303 (1970).
6Id.
IId. 5 309(a) states: "[I]f the Commission, upon examination of such application and
upon consideration of such other matters as the Commission may officially notice, shall find
that public interest, convenience, and necessity would be served by the granting thereof, it
shall grant such application."
I W. EMERY, supra note 4, at 307.
'47 U.S.C. §308(b) (1970).
" The Code provides that no broadcast licenses can be issued to any alien, foreign gov-
ernment, or corporation organized under the laws of any foreign government. If any officer
or director is an alien or if more than 20% of the stock is owned or voted by aliens, the
corporation cannot hold a license. There are also limitations on foreign ownership or con-
trol of a corporation owning more than 25% of the stock of a corporate applicant. Id.
310(a).
"' This requirement is not well defined. See, e.g., John Clarence Cook, 1 F.C.C.2d 1534
(1965) (license denied because of prior criminal record of applicant); Pacifica Foundation,
36 F.C.C. 147 (1964) (license granted, although membership in Communist party consid-
ered); Robinson v. FCC, 334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (license denied because of past
misrepresentations to the FCC). See generally Brown, Character and Candor Requirements
for FCC Licenses, 22 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 644 (1957).
"The applicant must be financially able "to construct and operate the proposed station."
47 U.S.C. § 319(a) (1970). The FCC has been relatively liberal in making grants when
there is proof that funds will be available to assure construction and initial operation of the
station. W. EMERY, supra note 4, at 232.
1" Staffing, studio, and equipment plans should be adequate to effectuate the proposal.
See W. EMERY, supra note 4, at 233. The FCC's general policy has been:
An indispensable element in passing upon any application for station licenses
is the technical qualifications of the applicant. This does not mean that the
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when a comparative hearing is held for the purpose of choosing among several
qualified applicants. Because of the expansion of the media after World War
II, the FCC was under pressure to develop specific criteria for determining who
would receive licenses in both original and renewal situations.14 These criteria
were adopted by the FCC in its 1965 Policy Statement on Comparative Broad-
cast Hearings." In determining which applicant would provide the best prac-
ticable service to the public, the Policy Statement required that the FCC look
to a variety of factors, including: proposed program plans and policies,0 local
ownership,"' integration of ownership and management, " participation in civic
activities,' record of past broadcasting performance," broadcasting experience,"
relative likelihood that proposals will be effectuated as shown by contracts
made with local suppliers," carefulness of operational planning," staffing,4
and likelihood that economic injury will result to existing licensees." Diversifi-
cation of control over the mass media is also a primary factor." The FCC has
chosen to delineate the above criteria through adjudicative proceedings rather
than by rulemaking. Thus, the criteria may be changed at any time, with no
prior notice.
Since the basic standard of public interest, convenience, and necessity is a
applicant in every case must be personally qualified technically, but it does
mean that if he is not personally qualified technically and does not propose
to operate the station himself but through employees, then he should show
that he has a competent staff to operate the proposed station for him, and their
technical qualifications.
W.H. Kindig, 3 F.C.C. 313, 315 (1936).
'" The history is traced in Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
15 1 F.C.C.2d 393 (1965).
"°See Sarkes Tarzian, Inc., 17 P & F RADIO REG. 905 (1959); Hi-Line Broadcasting
Co., 13 P & F RADIO REG. 1017 (1957) (good program "balance"); Tampa Times Co.,
10 P & F RADIO REG. 77 (1954); The Tribune Co., 9 P & F RADIO REG. 719 (1954)
(extensive local live broadcasts).
17See, e.g., St. Louis Telecast, Inc., 22 F.C.C. 625 (1957).
'" "The significance of the integration factor is based on our belief that there is more
assurance that a proposal will be effectuated if the day-to-day operation is in the hands of
an owner of the station than if the station is run by employees." Hi-Line Broadcasting Co.,
13 P & F RADIO REG. 1017, 1042 (1957).
'" Civic participation in community affairs in the city in which the station is located is
weighed more heavily than civic involvement in another community. See Cherokee Broad-
casting Co., 25 F.C.C. 92 (1958); Tampa Times Co., 10 P & F RADIO REG. 77 (1954).
"
5 See, e.g., Sangamon Valley Television Corp., 22 F.C.C. 1167 (1957) (emphasis on
past devotion to local live programming).
" See WHDH, Inc., 13 P & F RADIO REG. 507 (1957); Indianapolis Broadcasting,
Inc., 12 P & F RADIO REG. 883 (1957) (overriding both local residence and diversification
of control); Biscayne Television Corp., 11 P & F RADIO REG. 1113 (1956) (overriding
diversification of control); Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc., 11 P & F RADIO REG. 985 (1956)
(overriding local residence).
22 See, e.g., Hi-Line Broadcasting Co., 13 P & F RADIO REG. 1017 (1957); The Travelers
Broadcasting Serv. Corp., 12 P & F RADIO REG, 689 (1956); Sacramento Broadcasters, Inc.,
10 P & F RADIO REG. 615 (1955).
"See Florida Gulfcoast Broadcasters, Inc., 23 P & F RADIO REG. 1 (1962); Loyola
Univ., 12 P & F RADIO REG. 1017 (1956).
24 See Birney Imes, Jr., 17 P & F RADIO REG. 419 (1959) (competency of staff); Tampa
Times Co., 10 P & F RADIO REG. 77 (1954) (familiarity of staff with community).
"See, e.g., FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940); Note, Economic
Injury in FCC Licensing: The Public Interest Ignored, 67 YALE L.J. 135 (1957).
21 "Diversification is a factor of primary significance .... Other interests in the prin-
cipal community proposed to be served will normally be of most significance, followed by
other interests in the remainder of the proposed service area and, finally, generally in the
United States." Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 394
(1965).
COMMENTS
comparative and not an absolute standard, the FCC must determine which
applicants will best serve the public interest. Where there are two or more
mutually exclusive applications, the hearings on each application must be con-
solidated into one comparative hearing. This principle was first enunciated in
Ashbacker Radio Corp. v., FCC."7
This Comment examines the significant developments, both substantive and
procedural, in license renewal policy which have followed the 1965 Policy
Statement. It is submitted that none of these policies and proposals adequately
protect the public interest while assuring sufficient stability to the broadcasting
industry. A proposal which would better balance these diverse interests is
presented.
I. FIRST SIGNS OF CHANGE
A. The 1965 Policy Statement
The 1965 Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings" was an
attempt to set forth the criteria which the FCC had previously and would
continue to take into account in choosing among original applicants for the
same broadcasting license.2' The FCC recognized that the assignment of broad-
casting licenses is a complex and subjective area which does not lend itself to
precise categorization or binding precedent.' Furthermore, it observed that
membership on the FCC changes, and the views of individual Commissioners
on the relative importance of various criteria may change."' Thus, the criteria
cannot be assigned absolute values. Nevertheless, this statement was of major
importance because it categorically defined the criteria which would be con-
sidered by the FCC.
The primary objectives of the Policy Statement were to achieve "the best
practicable service to the public and a maximum diffusion of control of the
media .. .2 An important aspect of the Policy Statement was its treatment of
the significance to be attributed to any past performance by the applicant. "A
past record within the bounds of average performance will be disregarded, since
average future performance is expected. Thus, we are not interested in the
fact of past ownership per se, and will not give a preference because one
applicant has owned stations in the past and another has not."'
The 1965 Policy Statement specifically excluded the renewal situation,
stating that different problems were raised in that type of contest. Thus, it
appeared that the controlling standard in renewal proceedings was still that
27 326 U.S. 327 (1945). This principle is known as the Ashbackr doctrine. The
consolidated, comparative hearing is necessary since to grant one application would be to
deny the others without a hearing.
281 F.C.C.2d 393 (1965).
2 See notes 16-26 supra, and accompanying text.
3' "The various factors cannot be assigned absolute values, some factors may be present
in some cases and not in others, and the differences between applicants with respect to each
factor are almost infinitely variable." 1 F.C.C.2d at 393.
31 Id. The 7 members of the FCC are each appointed for 7-year terms, one term expiring
each year. 47 U.S.C. § 4 (1970).
32 1 F.C.C.2d at 394.
31 Id. at 398.
' Id. at 393 n.1.
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of Hearst Radio, Inc. (WBAL).' The FCC had held in WBAL that in a com-
parative hearing an incumbent with a record of "satisfactory" service will be
preferred absent gross violations of FCC rules. However, Commissioner Hyde,
dissenting from the 1965 Policy Statement, stated that there was no rational
or legal basis for the nonapplicability of the statement to renewal proceedings."
Under his view WBAL would no longer be controlling. His dissent formed
the basis for later decisions by both the FCC and the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia. For example, in a 1965 renewal case, Seven (7) League
Productions, Inc. (WIII),"' the FCC applied the 1965 Policy Statement to the
introduction of evidence, and it decided to give all parties in such a case an
opportunity to present arguments as to the relative weight to be given each
criterion. At this time the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, which had previously routinely approved renewals ordered by the
Commission, expressed concern in two cases" that renewal applicants might
be receiving an unfair advantage over new applicants because of exemption
from the 1965 Policy Statement.
B. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC
In Greater Boston Television Corp. v.. FCC (WHDH)" the court of ap-
peals held that the action of the FCC, in applying to what appeared to be a
renewal proceeding the same criteria it applied to new applications, was not
arbitrary nor unreasonable nor in violation of a legislative mandate. This case
marked the first time in broadcasting history that the FCC had refused to re-
new the license of a broadcaster with an "average" record of performance.4'
This holding marked a significant departure from the FCC's decision in
WBAL, eighteen years before.
WHDH had been operating Channel 8 in Boston under a series of tempo-
rary licenses for approximately fifteen years. Although the FCC had always
extended the license at the end of each period, which was generally one year,
3515 F.C.C. 1149 (1951).
"1 F.C.C.2d at 400-04.
37 1 F.C.C.2d 1597 (1965).
"South Fla. Television Corp. v. FCC, 349 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 987 (1966); Community Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 363 F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir.
1966).
" Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC (WHDH), 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cit. 1970),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971), aff'g WHDH, Inc., 16 F.C.C,2d 1, reconsideration de-
nied, 17 F.C.C.2d 856 (1969).
4' Although the court of appeals categorized WHDH as a renewal applicant in the hold-
ing, it recognized that this was a unique situation:
Hand crafted orders and procedures are particularly appropriate for unique
fact situations. On the unique facts presented, WHDH was neither a new
applicant nor a renewal applicant as those terms are generally construed.
Since these orthodox classifications, and the rules generally pertaining to each,
were not meaningfully available to the Commission on these facts, that body
soundly formulated an intermediate position for the instant case.
444 F.2d at 859.
"' For a detailed account of this case see Goldin, Spare the Golden Goose-The After-
math of WHDH in FCC License Renewal Policy, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1014 (1970); Jaffe,
WHDH: The FCC and Broadcasting License Renewals, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1693 (1969);
Comment, The Federal Communications Commission and Comparative Broadcast Hearings:
WHDH as a Case Study in Changing Standards, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 943 (1969);
Comment, The Aftermath of WHDH: Regulation by Competition or Protection of Medi-
ocrity?, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 368 (1970); Note, FCC License Renewal Policy and the Right
To Broadcast, 52 B.U.L. REV. 94, 95-98 (1972).
(Vol. 27
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it had never granted WHDH a full, three-year license. The court found that
under this unique fact situation WHDH was neither a new applicant nor a
renewal applicant, as those terms are generally construed. It was previously
thought that the 1965 Policy Statement was applicable only to original ap-
plications and not to renewal hearings.42 However, since both the court and
the FCC' found that WHDH was neither a new nor a renewal applicant,
this case does not hold that the criteria in the 1965 Policy Statement apply
to renewal proceedings. Nevertheless, many commentators: interpreted the
case as establishing the principle that an incumbent licensee was to be given
no preference over a challenger in a renewal proceeding. This was viewed as
the beginning of a new activism by the FCC.45
WHDH decided only that an average performance record does not merit
a preference in a comparative hearing in a case which is neither a new ap-
plication nor a renewal. While the actual shift by the FCC was minor, the
practical result was major. Since it appeared that the FCC had overruled its
policy towards preferences in renewal proceedings, the broadcasting industry
moved to protect its interests. The possibility of a successful challenge to an
incumbent was increased after WHDH, and the decision gave to citizen groups
seeking improvement in the quality of programming or additional minority
programming an increased amount of leverage in bargaining with licensees.
C. The Pastore Bill
While the decision of the FCC in WHDH, Inc. was still on appeal, the
broadcasting industry decided to act to prevent application of the WHDH
holding. This action took the form of Senate Bill 2004," introduced by Sena-
tor John Pastore, Chairman of the Communications Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on Commerce. The Pastore Bill provided that the FCC
could not consider any competing application until it had determined, after
a hearing, that it would not serve the public interest to grant the application of
the incumbent licensee.
The bill was based on the assumption that security of investment in the
broadcasting industry will ultimately benefit the public." Licensees must make
4 See notes 37, 38 supra.
4 16 F.C.C.2d at 8.
"See, e.g., Jaffe, supra note 41; Comment, The Aftermath of WHDH: Regulation by
Competition or Protection of Mediocrity?, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 368 (1970).
'See Comment, The Federal Communications Commission and Comparative Broadcast
Hearings: WHDH as a Case Study in Changing Standards, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV.
943 (1969).
46S. 2004, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). The bill would have amended 47 U.S.C.
309(a) (1970) by adding the following after the final sentence:
Notwithstanding any other provision of the Act, the Commission, in acting
upon any application for renewal of a broadcast license filed under section 308,
may not consider the application of any other person for the facilities for
which renewal is sought. If the Commission finds upon the record and repre-
sentations of the licensee that the public interest, convenience, and necessity
has been and would be served thereby, it shall grant the renewal application.
If the Commission determines after a hearing that a grant of the application
of a renewal applicant would not be in the public interest, convenience, and
necessity, it shall deny such application, and applications for construction per-
mits by other parties may then be accepted, pursuant to section 308, for the
broadcast service previously licensed to the renewal applicant whose renewal
was denied.
47 Hearings on S. 2004 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm.
19731
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large initial investments in equipment, facilities, programming, and personnel,
and technological changes require additional investments periodically. " Un-
doubtedly, this is an important consideration in the renewal challenge issue.
The insecurity of licensing could have an immense impact on the ability of
licensees to obtain capital and credit.49 It could also inhibit experimentation
and public service programming. However, broadcasting yields a high return
on investment. The average VHF station not only recovers its investment with-
in its initial license period, but also makes a profit.' Thus, the risk to the
broadcaster involved in limiting his assurance of a license to three years with
no guarantee of renewal is offset by the possibility of high profits.
Moreover, the effect of the bill would have been to remove the compara-
tive aspect from renewal proceedings. A challenger would not have had an
opportunity to show that the license should not be renewed on the basis that
his application would better serve the public interest. Neither could a chal-
lenger participate in the required hearing for the purpose of presenting evi-
dence to show that the renewal would not serve the public interest. The Pastore
Bill would have largely precluded the entrance of new station owners into
the broadcasting industry to replace those who might lose their licenses, which
was precisely what the broadcasting lobby wanted.
Although the bill was popular among congressmen, senators, and the
broadcasting industry,' it was attacked severely in the Senate hearings by
citizen groups.,2 These groups argued that the bill was racially prejudicial
and that it would exclude community efforts at improving television program-
ming." Such opposition slowed the progress of the bill.
A majority of the FCC 5 also opposed the Pastore Bill on the basis that
WHDH was a unique case and thus the FCC had not changed its license re-
on Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 22-30 (1969) (testimony of Frank P. Fogarty,
vice president, Meredith Corp.).
48A thorough examination of the background of the Pastore Bill is contained in Com-
ment, supra note 44.
" See Hearings, supra note 47, at 25-30.
"'According to FCC statistics the VHF stations recovered approximately 94% of their
depreciated investment in tangible broadcasting properties in 1965, 84% in 1966, and 64%
in 1967. 34 F.C.C. ANN. REP. 122, 126 (1968); 33 F.C.C. ANN. REP. 173, 176 (1967);
32 F.C.C. ANN. REP. 125, 126 (1966).
Earl K. Moore, general counsel of the National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting,
testified that the average television station recovers its depreciated investment twice over
with a reasonable return besides in a three-year license term. Hearings, supra note 47, pt.
1, at 114.
" More than 100 congressmen and 23 senators quickly announced support for the bill.
See generally Hearings, supra note 47.
"Id. pt. 2. Statement of John Pemberton, Jr., Executive Director, American Civil Liber-
ties Union, at 513; Rev. Everett C. Parker, Director, Office of Communication of the United
Church of Christ, at 522; Absalom Jordan, National Chairman, Black Efforts for Soul in
Television (BEST), at 601.
" ld. Statement of Absalom Jordan, at 601. He argued that it would exclude minorities
from the opportunity to participate in policy decisions of the media in most large cities since
broadcasters would be under little or no pressure to provide programming for minorities.
There would be no incentive to allow minorities to purchase an interest in the stations.
"Id. See also Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1210 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
" Commissioners Bartley, Johnson, H. Rex Lee, and Cox were opposed to the Pastore
Bill. Chairman Burch, Wells, and Robert E. Lee favored it. See the discussion by Commis-
sioner Cox in Cox, The Federal Communications Commission, 11 B.C. IND. & CoM. L.
REV. 595, 620 (1970).
[Vol. 2 7
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newal policy." The FCC further argued that there was no indication that the
stability of the broadcasting industry was so threatened that the benefits of
competition should be foregone." To avoid passage of the bill, the FCC
promptly adopted its 1970 Policy Statement.
II. THE 1970 POLICY STATEMENT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
A. The Policy Statement
While the Senate Subcommittee on Communications continued to hold
hearings on the Pastore Bill, the FCC issued its 1970 Policy Statement Con-
cerning Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Renewal Applicants."6 This
Policy Statement, designed as a compromise to the Pastore Bill, was apparently
issued to pacify the broadcasting industry and to eliminate the confusion which
had resulted following the WHDH decision." The essence of the statement
was:
[Ilf the applicant for renewal of license shows in a hearing with a competing
applicant that its program service during the preceding license term has been
substantially attuned to meeting the needs and interests of its area, and that
the operation of the station has not otherwise been characterized by serious
deficiencies, he will be preferred over the newcomer and his application for
renewal will be granted.6'
There were two considerations underlying this policy. First, the public should
receive the benefits of a challenge, to the extent that where the public interest
so requires a new applicant would be preferred. Second, the comparative hear-
ing policy should not undermine the predictability and stability of broadcast
operation."1
This Policy Statement was similar to the Pastore Bill in that it first required
a hearing to determine whether or not the incumbent should have his license
renewed, and only if the incumbent was disqualified could the challenger
present his case. However, it differed from the Pastore Bill by allowing the
challenger to participate in the first hearing to demonstrate his allegation that
the incumbent's performance had been minimal." In this respect the 1970
Policy Statement helped to preserve the stimulus of "private attorneys general,"
in the form of citizen groups,"' to protect the public interest.
56 See Goldin, supra note 41, at 1020.
5 Commissioner Bartley defended the advantages of the status quo:
The Commission strongly believes that the spur to a lagging broadcaster
posed by the threat of competitors at renewal time is an important factor in
securing operation in the public interest .... The existing procedures at re-
newal time provide a powerful supplement to our review capabilities in the
form of potential competitors who will provide more than a minimal service
to the public if the existing licensee is unwilling or unable to do so. The
first question posed by S. 2004 then, is whether there is anything in the record
of our administration of the act which indicates that the public interest in
stability is so threatened that the great benefits of competition must be for-
saken. We do not believe there is.
Hearings, supra note 47, at 376.5822 F.C.C.2d 424 (1970).
" Id. at 432 (Johnson, Commissioner, dissenting).
0 Id. at 425.
61 Id. at 424.6
' Id. at 425.
"3 See Goldin, supra note 41, at 1025.
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An important feature of this policy was that the renewal applicant had to
rely on his record during the entire last license term."4 No evidence of up-
grading of his operation after a competing application had been filed was
admissible. Neither would a licensee be able to render minimal service during
the first two years, upgrade the year before renewal, and still expect to have
his license renewed. This was designed to prevent a licensee from rendering
minimal service throughout his term, only to improve his performance and
retain his license if and when competition appeared. This was a significant
departure from WBAL.
Senator Pastore indicated his general approval of the statement5 and decided
to defer action on his bill until the policy had a fair test. Others were not so
easily placated. A serious weakness of the policy was that it did not adequately
define the essential terms: "substantial performance," "serious deficiencies," and
"minimal." In this respect the 1965 Policy Statement provided a much better
guide. It set out specific criteria to be applied," while the 1970 Policy State-
ment merely referred to dictionary definitions."7 Another weakness was that
the 1970 Policy Statement established two separate standards for renewals.
Incumbents were judged by the vague standard of "substantial performance"
if challenged, but they were only required to have rendered "minimal" service
if not challenged."' If the public interest was to be protected by this Policy
Statement, there should have been only one acceptable standard of perform-
ance-substantial.
A Staff Study for the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce' found several more faults
in the Policy Statement. It concluded that the 1970 Policy Statement denied
procedural due process since qualified applicants were denied a full hearing as
required by section 309(e) of the Communications Act' and by the Ashbacker
doctrine.' It also found that by substituting for a comparative hearing a uni-
lateral determination of renewal based solely on the licensee's past perform-
ance, the policy failed even to attempt to license the best qualified applicant.
Under this system of determination a challenger could indeed be the best
qualified but not obtain a license if the incumbent had rendered substantial
performance. In that situation the challenger would not even get a hearing
to demonstrate his superiority since the incumbent's license would be renewed
on the basis of the first hearing. The Staff Study concluded that the policy
rejected diversification of media control as a licensing criterion. That rejection
was in contradiction of the Communications Act" and the 1965 Policy State-
"22 F.C.C.2d at 427.
'See Krasnow, The Ninety-First Congress and the Federal Communications Comm is-
sion, 24 FED. COM. B.J. 97, 103 (1970).
"See notes 16-26 supra, and accompanying text.
" "Thus, the word 'substantially' is defined as 'strong; solid; firm; much; considerable;
ample; large; of considerable worth or value; important' (Webster's New World Dictionary
College Edition, p. 1454); the word 'minimal' carries the pertinent definition, 'smallest per-
missible' (Id. at p. 937)." 22 F.C.C.2d at 426.
8 Id.
"See Krasnow, supra note 65, at 146.
747 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1970).
"' The Staff Study was supported in this finding by the decision in Citizens Communica-
tions Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cit. 1971).
747 U.S.C. 5 314 (1970).
[Vol. 27
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ment.5 The Staff Study further argued that the policy overruled the three-year
license limit by virtually assuring existing broadcasting interests license con-
tinuation through the "substantial performance-serious deficiencies" test. This
objection emphasizes the fact that the definitions employed in this Policy
Statement are exceedingly vague." The fact that no challenging applications
were filed in the first ten months following issuance of the Policy Statement,
whereas eight were filed in the preceding year, was evidence that the Policy
Statement served to eliminate competition. 5
In effect, the Policy Statement administratively "enacted" what the Pastore
Bill sought to enact, although slanted slightly more toward the public interest
point of view than toward that of the broadcasting lobby. It eliminated the
confusion under WHDH and set forth a definite renewal policy. This policy
had the effect of a summary judgment on the pleadings since a full hearing
would seldom be held. The summary judgment approach of the policy, how-
ever, was diametrically opposed to both statutory and case law.
B. The Citizens Case
The 1970 Policy Statement was vigorously attacked by petitioners in Citizens
Communications Center v. FCC," an action by two public interest groups7
and two applicants competing for different licenses."8 Petitioners contended"
that the Policy Statement was invalid under section 309(e) of the Communi-
cations Act" as construed by the Supreme Court in Ashbacker Radio Corp. v.
FCC." The FCC argued that the Policy Statement was not a final order, nor
was it ripe for review. In the alternative, it argued the Policy Statement was
a valid exercise of FCC authority." After dismissing the ripeness and finality
arguments of the FCC," the Citizens court declared the 1970 Policy State-
" See note 26 supra.
'4 See note 68 supra, and accompanying text.
7 There were 8 competing applications out of approximately 250 renewal applications.
See Staff Study cited in Krasnow, supra note 65, at 18 n.101.
79447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
71 Citizens Communications Center (CCC) and Black Efforts for Soul in Television
(BEST) are nonprofit organizations, organized to improve radio and television service, to
promote responsiveness of the broadcast media to the local community, to improve the
position of minority groups in media ownership, access and coverage, and to present gen-
erally a public voice in FCC proceedings. They have appeared in numerous proceedings
before the FCC. Brief for Petitioners at 4, Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447
F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
78 Hampton Roads Television Corp. and Community Broadcasters of Boston, Inc. were
applicants for television licenses who had filed competing applications in Norfolk, Virginia,
and Boston, Massachusetts, respectively.
"CCC and BEST appealed under 47 U.S.C. S 402(a) (1970) and 28 U.S.C. § 2342
(1970) seeking review of: (1) the 1970 Policy Statement, (2) an order of the FCC dis-
missing a request by CCC and BEST to institute rulemaking proceedings to codify standards
for all comparative proceedings, 21 F.C.C.2d 335 (1970), and (3) an FCC order denying
reconsideration of the 1970 Policy Statement and further refusing to institute rulemaking
proceedings, 24 F.C.C.2d 383 (1970). Hampton Roads and Community Broadcasting ap-
pealed under the same statutes, seeking review of the FCC's denial of reconsideration of the
1970 Policy Statement and refusal to institute rulemaking. 447 F.2d at 1202 n.2.
"947 U.S.C. 5 309(e) (1970).
a' 326 U.S. 327 (1945).
82 447 F.2d at 1204.
SId. at 1206. The court did not decide other issues raised. Petitioners had also con-
tended that the Policy Statement was adopted in violation of § 4 of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970), since it should have been the subject of a rulemaking
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ment invalid since its summary judgment procedure would deny a challenger
a full hearing as required by section 309(e) of the Communications Act.8"
The court found that the Policy Statement violated the Ashbacker doctrine by
turning a competing application into a petition to deny renewal rather than
granting a full, comparative hearing.'
The Ashbacker doctrine, and the line of cases which followed it, is one of
the most important developments in American administrative law." Although
Ashbacker required a full, comparative hearing in the case of two original
applications, it has been recognized as also applicable to renewal applications.
The FCC implicitly accepted the Ashbacker doctrine as applicable to renewal
proceedings in the 1970 Policy Statement. However, an attempt was made by
the FCC, through the 1970 Policy Statement,87 to dilute the Ashbacker doc-
trine. Under the 1970 Policy Statement, during the initial phase of a compara-
tive hearing, the renewal applicant would be given the opportunity to estab-
lish the substantiality of its record. If this was done, the Hearing Examiner
would halt the proceeding and make a determination to grant the renewal.
Only if the renewal applicant could not show that its record was without
serious defect, would a full, comparative hearing be held.88 The court in
Citizens drew a fine line betweeen Ashbacker and the 1970 Policy Statement
regarding the promises made by the FCC in each.89 Prior to the decision in
Citizens, the FCC in Ashbacker had promised a full hearing to the applicant
on the application, only after the competing application had been granted."
The Supreme Court said in Ashbacker that such a promise was an "empty
thing."'" The Citizens court found that in the Policy Statement the FCC at
least "must be given credit for honesty."" The "full hearing" requirement
of section 309(e) of the Communications Act, as interpreted by Ashbacker,
was simply denied to license renewal challengers."
In reaching its decision in Citizens, the court did not merely invalidate the
Policy Statement to the extent that it did not provide a full hearing. The court
also set out specific factors which were to be included in developing standards
for the FCC to follow in lieu of those in the Policy Statement." Incumbents
were to be judged primarily on their records of past performance." The in-
proceeding, and that the Policy Statement restricted and chilled the exercise of first amend-
ment rights.
84447 F.2d at 1211.
"Id. at 1210 n.28.
98 Id. at 1211. See also note 27 supra, and accompanying text. The line of cases following
Ashbacker includes: Overseas Nat'l Airways v. CAB, 426 F.2d 725 (2d Cir. 1970); Pollack
v. Simonson, 350 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Northwest Airlines v. CAB, 194 F.2d 339
(D.C. Cir. 1952).
87 If the FCC had not accepted Ashbacker it would not have had to allow the challenger
a hearing at all.
" Policy Statement Concerning Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Renewal Ap-
plicants, 22 F.C.C.2d at 428.
"447 F.2d at 1211.
90326 U.S. at 330.
91 1d.
92447 F.2d at 1211.
9 Id.
"I id. at 1213-14.
"'Insubstantial past performance should preclude renewal of a license. The licensee,
having been given the chance and having failed, should be through. . . .At the same time,
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cumbent must have rendered "superior service" as evidenced by elimination
of excessive and loud advertising, delivery of quality programming, and
whether and to what extent the incumbent had reinvested the profit from his
license for the benefit of his audience." Diversification of control of the media
was to continue to be a major factor in both renewal and original licensing.97
The result of Citizens was a return to the criteria enumerated in the 1965
Policy Statement. Citizens finally made it clear that the 1965 Policy Statement
applies to renewal as well as to original applications. Incumbents no longer
have an advantage per se.98 Mere past broadcasting experience is of little sig-
nificance under Citizens."' This can be an impediment to the applicant who
owns other stations since diversification of control of the media is once again
being emphasized.' Since the standards for awarding a license are much more
precise in the 1965 Policy Statement than in the 1970 Policy Statement, all
parties involved should now know what standards they are expected to meet.
Licenses awarded after Citizens should be more likely to go to the best quali-
fied applicant. Citizens was truly a triumph for the public interest lobby.
However, soon after Citizens was decided the broadcast lobby resumed its
efforts to protect incumbent licensees. Several bills were introduced in the
ninety-second Congress which again would have given the incumbent a pre-
ference in renewal proceedings. The National Association of Broadcasters
(NAB) supported a bill by Representative James T. Broyhill"0 ' which would
extend the license period from three to five years. The incumbent would be
granted renewal if he could demonstrate that his past performance had reflected
a "'good faith effort' to serve his community, and that he has 'not demonstrated
a callous disregard for law or the [FCC's] regulations.'""" Action was not
taken on any of these proposals in the ninety-second Congress.
C, The Administration Proposal
More than twenty license renewal bills have been introduced in the ninety-
third Congress.'" Most are similar in content to, and are based on, the NAB
Bill." One of these is an administration proposal.'" Drafted by the Office
of Telecommunications Policy, the bill would provide for a five-year license
superior performance should be a plus of major significance in renewal proceedings." Id.
at 1213.
"'Id. at 1213 n.35.
"Ild. at 1213 n.36.
" For a detailed analysis of the Citizens case, see Note, supra note 41.
9"447 F.2d at 1212-13.
'See Note, supra note 41.
"' H.R. 539, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); see Whitehead Bill Joins the Crowd Seeking
To Ease Renewal Trauma, BROADCASTING, Jan. 1, 1973, at 24. See also Conservatives Apply
Against "Post" Stations in Florida, BROADCASTING, Jan. 8, 1973, at 16-17.
"I Whitehead Bill Joins the Crowd Seeking To Ease Renewal Trauma, BROADCASTING,
Jan. 1, 1973, at 24.
'0" See Renewal Relief Gains New Favor in New Congress, BROADCASTING, Jan. 15,
1973, at 31.
'O See authorities cited note 101 supra.
'05BRADcASTING, Jan. 15, 1973, at 10. The full text of the bill is reprinted in The
Words that Go with the Music in the Whitehead Doctrine, BROADCASTING, Jan. 1, 1973,
at 20. The bill is entitled: "A bill to amend the Communications Act of 1934 to provide
that licenses for the operation of a broadcast station shall be issued for a term of five years,




period. Renewal would be based on the licensee's having met the standards
of (1) having been substantially attuned to the needs and interests of the
community and having demonstrated a good faith response to those needs,
and (2) having afforded a "reasonable opportunity for the discussion of con-
flicting views on issues of public importance...."0 Only if the FCC found, in
a preliminary hearing, that the incumbent did not merit renewal would a
challenger be allowed a hearing. The administration proposal is an effort to
"restore equilibrium to the broadcasting industry."'' 7 Administration spokesmen
say the bill seeks to balance the competing goals of the Communications Act
requiring broadcasters to operate in the public interest while denying the FCC
the power to censor licensees for failure to do so. " The major advantages of
the bill, according to the administration, are: (1) that it would extend the
license term from three to five years; (2) that it would eliminate the require-
ment for a comparative hearing whenever a competing application is filed
against a renewal applicant, and a hearing would be held only if a "substantial
question" regarding the licensee's performance was raised; (3) it would pro-
hibit ad hoc restructuring of the broadcasting industry through "manipulation
of broadcast-renewal criteria"; and (4) it would prohibit the FCC from "con-
sidering its own predetermined program criteria in applying ascertainment
and fairness standards.""'
It is apparent that the administration proposal would violate section 309(e)
of the Communications Act' and the Ashbacker doctrine. Again, a challenger
is denied a full hearing until after the preliminary hearing is held. Procedu-
rally, the hearing process would be the following."' The challenger would
be allowed to include in his application "specific allegations of fact sufficient
to show that grant of the application for renewal would be prima facie in-
consistent with""' the two standards to be considered."' He would be allowed
to file affidavits of persons with personal knowledge of these facts. The re-
newal applicant would have an opportunity to file a reply alleging other facts
or denials of allegations, supported by affidavits. The FCC would then make
a summary judgment upon the basis of the application, the pleadings filed,
"' The Words that Go with the Music in the Whitehead Doctrine, BROADCASTING, Jan.
1, 1973, at 20.
" See OTP's Vhitehead Ticks 0# Four Major Virtues of License-Renewal Bill, BROAD-
CASTING, Jan. 15, 1973, at 11.
108 Id.
109 Id.
11047 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1970). The section requires that
[i)f, in the case of any application to which subsection (a) (requiring that
the public interest, convenience and necessity be served in granting a license]
applies, a substantial and material question of fact is presented or the Com-
mission for any reason is unable to make the finding specified in such sub-
section, it shall formally designate the application for hearing on the ground
or reasons then obtaining and shall forthwith notify the applicant and all
other known parties in interest of such action and the grounds and reasons
therefor, specifying with particularity the matters and things in issue but not
including issues or requirements phrased generally. . . . Any hearing sub-
sequently held upon such application shall be a full hearing in which the
applicant and all other parties in interest shall be permitted to participate.
. Proposed § 307 (d) (3); see note 105 supra.




and "other matters which it may officially notice."1"" The standard for granting
renewal in the summary proceeeding would be that if "there are no sub-
stantial and material questions of fact and . . . a grant of the application to
renew the license would be consistent with [the two standards], it shall grant
such application, terminate the proceeding and issue a concise statement of
the reasons for its finding.""1 If the FCC determines that there is a substantial
and material question of fact, or if for any reason the FCC is unable to find
that the grant of the renewal application would be consistent with the standards
for renewal, it would proceed with the section 309(e) hearing.1 '
At first glance section 309(e) of the Communications Act and section
307(d) (3) (B) of the proposal appear to say the same thing. The difference
is in the standard to be applied and how that standard is interpreted. Section
309(e), as interpreted in Citizens, would allow a full, comparative hearing
whenever the challenger was legitimate and not merely making a "strike"
application. The administration proposal is calculated to make certain that
there is no "substantial and material question of fact" which would warrant a
full hearing. It requires merely "good faith" efforts to be responsive to com-
munity needs and a "reasonable opportunity" for discussion of conflicting views.
The standards are so minimal and so vague that a challenger would have
difficulty in showing in the pleadings that an incumbent had not met them.
Further, there is not even a preliminary hearing in which the challenger may
confront the incumbent. Only if the FCC is unable to make a summary judg-
ment is a hearing held. Clearly, the spirit, if not the letter, of the law is
violated by this proposal.
Another supposed advantage of the bill is that the license term would be
extended from three to five years. 7 This might reduce the licensee's financial
risk somewhat by giving him a longer period in which to recover his initial
investment. However, as discussed above,1 ' most VHF stations not only recover
the initial investment but make profits in the initial three-year license period.
Thus, this change would be of greatest benefit to marginally productive sta-
tions. The extended license period might be of more value in programming,
however, since it takes time to develop new programs."9 Also, the longer
license period might give licensees an incentive to develop more public-
service progtamming on which the profit, if any, would not be as large as for
commercial programming. Whether or not broadcasters would do so is another
question. Broadcasters would be so well protected at renewal time under the
administration proposal that it is doubtful that many would sacrifice profits
for public service. In summary, the public could be the beneficiary of sig-
nificant programming developments and increased public service programming
if the license period were increased from three to five years, but it probably
would not be under this particular proposal.
The third "advantage" of the proposal is a direct attack on the renewed
1141d. § 307(d) (3).
115 1d. § 307(d) (3) (B).
116 Id.
'Id. § 307(d)(1).
See notes 47-50 supra, and accompanying text.
"' W. EMERY, szupra note 4, at 375.
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emphasis on the diversification of control of the media factor. However, the
proposal ignores the fact that it was the court in Citizens,"2 and not the FCC,
which placed greater emphasis on this factor. The FCC clarified its stand in
the 1970 Policy Statement:
[Wlhatever action may be called for in special hearings where particular
facts concerning undue concentration or abusive conduct ... are alleged, the
overall structure of the industry, so far as multiple ownership and diversifica-
tion are concerned, should be the subject of general rulemaking proceedings
rather than ad hoc decisions in renewal hearings.121
Thus, this part of the proposal would have absolutely no effect on the FCC's
attitude towards these types of changes.
The fourth virtue of the proposal, prohibiting the FCC from considering
predetermined program criteria, clearly gives the advantage to the incumbent.
If there are no predetermined criteria to be met it would be practically im-
possible for a challenger to make a case sufficient to insure a hearing. The
incumbent would have to have performed at an extremely low level to lose
his license on this basis, and few would risk the consequences. It would be
a simple matter merely to perform minimally, and to have the license renewed
because the challenger could not prove a failure to meet the criteria if no
criteria existed other than those vague ones in the proposal. 2'
If adopted, the administration proposal would do a great disservice to the
public interest in broadcasting. Like the Pastore Bill, it would virtually insure
the renewal of licenses. There would be no incentive for broadcasters to im-
prove their service, and potential new applicants would be discouraged from
serving their roles as "private attorneys general" because of the futility of their
challenge. It should not be adopted.
The FCC has not yet formulated its position on the administration pro-
posal." ' It has been considering proposals for revamping its license renewal
procedures and policies. One set of guidelines under consideration for de-
termining what stations merit preferences at renewal time would be barred
by the administration bill." It appears that the FCC will not take action in
this area until it can be determined whether or not Congress is going to act.
III. CONCLUSION
Many alternatives" have been proposed to balance the competing interests
120 See note 97 supra, and accompanying text.
121 22 F.C.C.2d at 428.
12' These are the familiar "good faith effort" and "reasonable opportunity" standards.
See § 307(d) (2) of the proposal, supra note 105.
113 See Conservatives Apply Against "Post" Stations in Florida, BROADCASTING, Jan. 8,
1973, at 16.
"'The guidelines consist of percentages of different kinds of programming. Id.
2"See, e.g., Jaffe, supra note 41; Comment, supra note 44. One unique proposal calls
for a license term of up to 6 years, with the possibility of a hearing after 3 years. At that
time the FCC would either extend the license for another 3 years or issue a warning that
the licensee's performance was unsatisfactory and he is in danger of losing his license at
renewal. At the end of the 6-year period there would be 3 possibilities: (1) no challenge-
the license is renewed; (2) challenge by a preferred applicant (one who had successfully
challenged at the end of 3 years)-if the preferred applicant prevails he receives the license,
otherwise the incumbent's license is renewed; (3) challenge by a competing applicant (one
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of the public and the broadcasting lobby. In the past, whenever a change was
actually made it was a radical change. The 1965 Policy Statement and its
interpretation in WHDH favored the public. The pendulum swung to the
broadcasters' side in the Pastore Bill, and was tempered by the 1970 Policy
Statement. However, the 1970 Policy Statement, while having a good bal-
ance, violated the Communications Act and the Ashbacker doctrine. It was
replaced by the decision in Citizens, once again a very pro-public interest
effect. If any of the current proposals in Congress, all of which are based on
the NAB supported bill, are adopted, there will once again be a shift in favor
of the broadcasting lobby. Surely a compromise is possible.
There is nothing objectionable in increasing the license term to five years.
Reasonable criteria which can be judicially interpreted can be formulated.
Those criteria considered under the 1965 Policy Statement are reasonable and
can be interpreted by the court when necessary. The ultimate criterion should
be "Who will give the best service?" Certainly, ad hoc restructuring of the
broadcasting industry should be prohibited. If new criteria are to be considered,
or if changes are to be made in the importance of existing criteria, this could
be done through the FCC's rulemaking procedures, which are prescribed by
the Administrative Procedure Act."U Most importantly, a full, comparative
hearing should be compulsory in the renewal process. It should be dispensed
with only if the FCC finds that the challenger merely is making a "strike"
application. Such a finding would be a final order and thus ripe for judicial
review. This would preserve the challenger's rights.
A compromise of this type would protect the interests of the broadcasting in-
dustry. It would give the industry the longer license term it seeks. It would pro-
tect broadcasters from having to defend against "strike" applications. Further,
it would assure broadcasters that the FCC could not arbitrarily change the
criteria for renewal. A broadcaster would know where he stood, and, if con-
scientious, he would not have to worry about not having his license renewed.
If he had a record of superior performance he would have an advantage over
a challenger with no past broadcasting record. This would protect the con-
scientious broadcaster from challengers who deliberately made unrealistic
promises of better performance solely in order to obtain the license.
At the same time the public interest would be protected. Specific criteria
would be considered in the renewal proceeding. This would allow the chal-
lenger to build a case against the incumbent and at the same time show that
he offers the best service available because he does meet the criteria. The com-
pulsory full, comparative hearing would give a challenger a chance to be
heard.
who had not challenged before)-if the competing applicant prevails, the incumbent retains
his license for 3 years and the competing applicant becomes a preferred applicant. See Com-
ment, The FCC and Broadcasting License Renewals: Perspectives on 1VrHDH, 36 U. CHI.
L. REV. 854, 876-77 (1969).
"'6Administrative Procedure Act § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
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